

MORAL VALUES AS AN OBJECT OF ARGUMENTATION: CONCEPTUAL DISTINCTIONS AND THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS

Tillakhujaeva Sevarakhon Fazliddinkhuja kizi

Independent (PhD) researcher of National university of Uzbekistan

ORCID: 0009-0007-7112-582X

Email: tillakhujaevas@gmail.com

Tel: +998502022175

ABSTRACT

This article examines moral values as an object of argumentation by clarifying related concepts such as moral reasoning, ethical argumentation, moral argumentation, and the argumentation of moral values. It argues that moral reasoning is a broad category, while the argumentation of moral values should be treated as a distinct concept focused on the validity of moral evaluations. The study also shows that moral values are shaped not only by individual judgment, but also by social needs, collective harmony, and axiological evaluation.

Keywords: *moral values, argumentation, moral reasoning, ethical argumentation, moral argumentation, axiology, D. Fayzikhodjayeva.*

АННОТАЦИЯ

В данной статье моральные ценности рассматриваются как объект аргументации, при этом уточняются связанные с ними понятия, такие как моральное рассуждение, этическая аргументация, моральная аргументация и аргументация моральных ценностей. Обосновывается, что моральное рассуждение представляет собой более широкую категорию, тогда как аргументацию моральных ценностей следует рассматривать как самостоятельное понятие, ориентированное на формирование отношения к обоснованности моральных оценок. Исследование также показывает, что моральные ценности формируются не только индивидуальным суждением, но и социальными потребностями, коллективной гармонией и аксиологической оценкой.

Ключевые слова: *моральные ценности, аргументация, моральное рассуждение, этическая аргументация, моральная аргументация, аксиология, Д. Файзиходжаева.*

ANNOTATSIYA

Ushbu maqolada axloqiy qadriyatlar argumentlash obyeki sifatida tadqiq qilinib, axloqiy mulohaza yuritish, etik argumentlash, axloqiy argumentlash hamda axloqiy qadriyatlarni argumentlash kabi o'zaro bog'liq tushunchalar aniqlashtiriladi.

Unda axloqiy mulohaza yuritish kengroq kategoriya ekani, axloqiy qadriyatlarni argumentlash esa axloqiy baholashlarning asosli ekanligiga doir munosabatni shakllantirishga qaratilgan alohida tushuncha sifatida talqin qilinishi lozimligi asoslanadi. Tadqiqot shuni ham ko'rsatadiki, axloqiy qadriyatlar nafaqat individual hukm, balki ijtimoiy ehtiyojlar, jamoaviy uyg'unlik va aksiologik baholash bilan ham shakllanadi.

***Kalit so'zlar:** axloqiy qadriyatlar, argumentlash, axloqiy mulohaza yuritish, etik argumentlash, axloqiy argumentlash, aksiologiya, D. Fayzixodjayeva.*

INTRODUCTION

The analysis of moral values as an object of argumentation should begin with a definition and description of the argumentation of moral values and the concepts associated with it. Clarifying these concepts allows us to identify the boundaries of the research and, in accordance with the principle of interdisciplinarity, to strengthen the integration of such fields as logic, moral philosophy, the philosophy of values, and folklore studies.

A review of the literature shows that scholars have used several concepts to express the relationship between morality and logic. Among these terms, the concept of moral reasoning appears, in our view, to be the generic category, because many concepts related to morality and logic fall under it. According to the definition given in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, moral reasoning, although it may be conducted on behalf of others, is paradigmatically a first-person practical reflection, whether individual or collective, on what an agent morally ought to do. In this process, a person reflects on the moral nature of an action before carrying it out and evaluates it on the basis of values, criteria, and intuitions that they accept [1]. However, according to the American psychologist J. Haidt, moral reasoning may sometimes bypass the standard of impartiality and instead be used to justify personal interests and desires, that is, *myside bias*.

At this point, one aspect of the interactionist approach proposed by H. Mercier and D. Sperber becomes directly relevant to our topic. According to this approach, reason evolved not in isolation, but in response to problems arising in social interaction. In other words, reason reveals and improves its capacities through interaction with others. It performs two basic functions: first, it helps solve problems of coordination by producing reasons; second, it helps solve problems of communication by producing arguments. Therefore, reason develops its capacities in response to social problems, which confirms the evolutionary development of reasoning competence [2].

METHODOLOGY

This article is based on conceptual and comparative analysis. Its main method is the close examination of theoretical literature related to morality, reasoning, argumentation, and value theory. The study follows an interdisciplinary approach and draws on logic, ethics, and axiology in order to identify the conceptual boundaries of the phenomenon under discussion. The method consists primarily in comparing related concepts, distinguishing their functions, and clarifying the place of moral values within the field of argumentation.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION


Moral reasoning as a broader category. The literature suggests that moral reasoning can be treated as the broadest category among concepts linking morality and logic. A person, before acting, reflects on whether a given act is morally acceptable and evaluates it on the basis of internalized values and standards. At the same time, this process is not always fully objective. As Haidt notes, moral reasoning may serve not only to discover what is right, but also to defend what one already wants to believe. This introduces an important tension into the study of moral judgment: reasoning may operate both as a tool of ethical reflection and as an instrument of self-justification.

The relevance of Mercier and Sperber's interactionist approach becomes especially clear here. If reason emerges and develops in response to the demands of social interaction, then moral reasoning should also be understood in a communicative and socially conditioned framework. Reason does not merely function inside the isolated mind; it becomes stronger in dialogue, dispute, and cooperation. This understanding is important for the present study, because it shows that argumentation and moral evaluation are inseparable from social context.

Ethical argumentation and moral argumentation. European and Russian scholars distinguish ethical argumentation from moral argumentation. According to the Russian researcher Y. N. Viktoruk, ethical argumentation is the act of persuading someone of the truth of certain stereotypes of behavior and values through moral and practical, explicit and implicit, verbal and nonverbal means. Through this process, three things become clarified: first, the concrete actions of a person; second, the moral subject's own understanding of their conduct and deeds; and third, their evaluation of the conduct and deeds of others [3]. D. Walton also notes that ethical argumentation has significant similarities with legal argumentation, since in both cases arguments are often expressed in the form of Toulmin-style reasoned conclusions based on two grounds [4].

Yet another aspect of the issue should also be taken into account, namely Haidt’s theory of the “wag-the-dog’s-tail illusion.” According to this view, in moral disputes even very strong arguments may fail to change the addressee’s position, because people often remain under the influence of feelings and intuitions [2]. Nevertheless, experiments conducted by P. Leman and G. Duveen show that argumentation can in fact influence moral decisions in a positive way. This suggests that the persuasive force of argumentation in moral matters should not be either absolutized or dismissed entirely. Rather, it operates under specific psychological and social conditions.

In contrast to ethical argumentation, moral argumentation may be interpreted in two senses. First, it can refer to the development, defense, and justification of what is known as the “moral argument.” Second, moral argumentation may be understood as an inseparable part of human thinking and activity, including the value-based



justification of actions, choices, and behavior [5]. In this sense, the rationality of an action is grounded in a certain moral value. However, in moral argumentation the truth of moral values is usually assumed in advance and treated as axiomatic. For this reason, the concept of moral argumentation does not fully include the argumentation of moral values themselves and does not entirely cover that domain.

The argumentation of moral values as a distinct concept. The concept of the argumentation of moral values was first introduced by the logician D. Fayzikhodjayeva. According to her definition, the argumentation of moral values is

the process of forming a positive or negative attitude in the audience toward the evaluation of universal, national, social, and personal moral norms, ideals, requirements, and goals, and thereby convincing them of the validity of such evaluations, securing their acceptance, and encouraging their practical application [6]. In this definition, the notion of evaluation clearly refers to axiological evaluation, and precisely at this point the connection between the topic and the philosophy of values becomes evident.

As noted in *Qadriyatlar falsafasi*, the evaluation of a value also expresses a subjective attitude toward it, and this attitude is connected with human needs, demands, and goals [7]. In this sense, moral values differ from merely personal values that are subjectively preferred, because moral values are linked to the needs, aims, and expectations of society and serve the harmonious life of its members. Consequently, the argumentation of moral values should be understood as a process that goes beyond individual preference and enters the sphere of socially significant evaluation.

The role of social context in the argumentation of moral values. As noted above, reasoning develops into a new stage as social processes change. In the same way, changes in society also affect moral values. In accordance with historical necessity, one value or another may move to the forefront of social development and appear to overshadow the rest [7]. Thus, in a period of famine, values such as solidarity, sharing, and mutual support become dominant, whereas in times of invasion, the defense of the homeland and patriotism may take priority.

When social processes change, the tendency to stabilize those values that carry high axiological significance for a given era becomes stronger. This happens because such values unite members of society and provide motivation for solving emerging social problems. In order to stabilize socially urgent values, they must be promoted among the people. Moreover, if society seeks to ensure that people internalize such values and act on their basis, then those values must be strongly argued for. Here again another aspect of Mercier and Sperber's interactionist approach [6] becomes visible. In practice, people usually choose ways of arguing moral values according to the audience. Through repeated communication, they identify the coordinates through which a person receives information and avoid arguments that are likely to be rejected. In this process, argumentative reasoning becomes more refined and rises to a new level. This confirms that changes in social processes lead not only to changes in the world of values, but also to the improvement of the capacities of reasoning itself.

CONCLUSION

The analysis shows that moral values should be regarded as a distinct object of argumentation. This requires a clear differentiation between moral reasoning, ethical argumentation, moral argumentation, and the argumentation of moral values. Moral reasoning serves as the broader framework within which many morality-related concepts can be situated, while ethical and moral argumentation represent more specific forms of justification. The argumentation of moral values, however, occupies a special place because it is directed not simply toward defending an action, but toward shaping attitudes toward the validity of values themselves. Since such values are connected with axiological evaluation, social needs, and collective harmony, their argumentation must be understood as both a philosophical and a social process.

REFERENCES:

1. <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/reasoning-moral/#DefiMoraReas>
2. Mercier, H., & Sperber, D. (2017). *The Enigma of Reason*. Harvard University Press. 305 pp.
3. Викторук Е.Н. Неклассические модели этической аргументации. Автореферат. - СПб.: Изд во РГПУ, 2004. С.19
4. Walton, Douglas N. (2003). *Ethical Argumentation*. Lexington Books. 8 pp.
5. Медведев, В. А. Теория моральной аргументации : учебное пособие. - Екатеринбург: Изд-во Урал. ун-та, 2022.— С.7-8
6. Fayzixo‘jayeva D. *Argumentlash va kommunikatsiya: Monografiya*. - Toshkent: “Shafolat Nur Fayz”, 2021. – B.119
7. Nazarov Q. *Qadriyatlar falsafasi (Aksiologiya)*. – Toshkent: Faylasuflar milliy jamiyati nashriyoti, 2004 – B.28